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COMMENTARY
ON HEALTH JUSTICE. SOME THOUGHTS AND RESPONSES TO CRITICS
SRIDHAR VENKATAPURAM
INTRODUCTION
It is with enormous gratitude that I begin this response
to the six articles evaluating, critiquing, and proposing
improvements to different aspects of the argument I pre-
sented in Health Justice.1 I am extremely grateful to the
guest editors of this collection of articles, namely Alena
Buyx, Eszter Kollar, and Sebastian Lauk€otter. And, I
must also thank the authors, the anonymous peer
reviewers of these six articles, and the editors of this
journal for their time, effort, and, essentially, support.
Watching the making of this special issue has been a
good reminder of how ones academic contributions are
profoundly interwoven and interdependent with those of
ones colleagues.
Health Justice was published first in the United King-
dom in late 2011, so it would be understandable to won-
der why a series of articles responding to it are being
published in early 2016. Journals will usually not review
a book that is more than four years old. And most
author-meets-critics events and related publications
happen right before or soon after the books initial pub-
lication date. So the present special issue is, indeed,
unusual. The book has for the most part received favour-
able reviews in different disciplinary journals, and has
begun to motivate some doctoral dissertations as well as
some policy and programmatic work. Interestingly,
though, it has not appealed to American audiences as
much as to academics and policymakers in Europe and
developing countries. This is a puzzle that is true for the
capabilities approach more generally. One of the editors
of the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
recently pointed out that unlike most other academic
journals this journal devoted to the capabilities approach
sees more downloads of articles from outside the United
States than from within.
The sociology of intellectual ideas has been a long
standing interest of mine. Despite philosophers stating
that they think abstractly and about ideas that will perse-
vere for a long time, it is easy to see how social context
shapes the scope and content of their ideas. For example,
after reviewing a decade or more of issues of journals
such as Ethics or Philosophy and Public Affairs, it is easy
to trace a link between the published articles and the
contemporaneous social context to which they were
responding. One of the reasons I went to Cambridge to
do my PhD was that finding academic support for devel-
oping a philosophical argument for a human right to
health was easier there than at Harvard where I initially
started graduate school. However, we also know that
some ideas will not survive if they are not presented in a
particular way, by certain people, or if the social context
is not supportive. Do you know the story about the
Dvorak keyboard? There are some social contexts where
true ideas, facts, will simply not be believed. President
Obamas birth certificate is one good example. On
different occasions I have had to pause and think about
the social context of advocating for a capabilitarian per-
spective to health justice. One event is worth noting.
There is a journal called Choice which is important for
the business of academic publishing as it reviews about
7000 academic books each year; it is a shopping list for
university librarians. Seeing no review, we contacted
them in late 2012 asking if they got a review copy. An
editor replied that, no, they had not received the copy of
the book. And, in any case, they only review books
meant for American undergraduates. So I wrote back
asking what about a book titled Health Justice or my
name makes it seem that it is not meant for American
undergraduates. They replied that it was too late for a
review as the book was published in 2011.
The Munster symposium and the present collection of
papers reflect certain features that I really value about
working as an (American) academic in Europe. The par-
ticipants are often well versed in the state-of-the-art
scholarly debates in the English-speaking world. Yet they
also provide alternative perspectives and propositions
that one would not normally find in Anglo-American
environments. For me and other colleagues, discussions
on health justice and global health justice must open up
to include many more perspectives than what has largely
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been dominated so far by Anglo-American philosophers.
This is also becoming recognized in global justice
philosophy more broadly. Just within Europe there are
distinctly different ethical approaches and arguments
regarding health and social justice among philosophers
in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Spain.
We have to hear these voices. The fact that the present
collection of articles contains perspectives of individuals
from the far corners of the world is largely due to the
exceptional skills of the guest editors. They have trained
and worked in various countries including the United
States, and are now based in Germany. They are produc-
ing scholarly work that is engaged with the state of the
art of debates in the fields of bioethics and political
philosophy, is of the highest quality, and importantly,
they speak coherently and with relevance to audiences
across many countries. They do not slip easily or care-
lessly into universal language. So it is both a great pleas-
ure and a privilege to be associated with this new
generation of international philosophers.
CRITIQUES
At the outset, I must acknowledge how much I have ben-
efitted from reading and reflecting on the six articles by
the eight contributors to the present special issue. Indeed,
all of the authors present substantial criticisms of various
aspects of the argument presented in Health Justice.
However, most of them also generously suggest ways to
amend the argument to address their criticisms. Impor-
tantly, rather than simply criticizing, each of the articles
teaches in its own way on various topics in relation to
their criticism. I cannot think of better kinds of critics.
The contributors would agree with me, I believe, that
there could be an endless supply of both major and
minor criticisms of the argument in Health Justice. What
can be frustrating is when criticisms are based on
misunderstandings, wilful misrepresentations or are just
misdirected. This is clearly not the case of the present
authors. I begin first with motivation for the argument,
then a brief summary of the argument, before addressing
the criticisms. I am unable to address every criticism
made by the contributors, nor do I think I am expected
to do that. I have tried to be diligent about addressing at
least the major criticisms of each contribution.
In Health Justice, I strive to make a moral right to
health a coherent and viable concept by extending the
capabilities approach (CA) to the health domain. Put
simply, the aim is to bring rights, health, and capabilities
together in a way that could be practicable as well as
philosophically coherent. Some scholars represent the
CA as a partial theory of social justice and others see it
is an approach to social justice. It is also presented as
something even more abstract than a theory of justice;
that it is an intellectual discipline or ethical theory.2 In
any case, since the basic ideas of the CA were articulated
by Sen in 1981,3 it has developed to the point where it is
generally accepted that it is a plausible candidate theory
for grounding basic moral rights for human beings as
well as for the human rights articulated in international
law.4 Sen had from the start linked capabilities to rights.5
I have been interested in linking the CA and human
rights since the early 1990s. My initial exposure to the
CA was in 1989 when I heard Amartya Sen deliver a lec-
ture on famines. I then used his entitlement analysis of
famines, and Martha Nussbaums arguments regarding
basic human capabilities, to write a paper on women and
HIV/AIDS for her course on feminist philosophy in
1994. Informed by Sens entitlement analysis and
Nussbaums arguments for moral claims to central
human capabilities, my undergraduate dissertation
argued that addressing the global HIV/AIDS epidemic
will require integrating and promoting both civil and
political rights as well as economic and social rights.
This was motivated by an exchange I had while working
at Human Rights Watch where it was explained to me
by the Director that the right to health and all the eco-
nomic and social rights were misconceived. This interest
in the link between health and the philosophy of human
rights continued in graduate school where I worked with
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to
Development to develop its conceptual framework, and
wrote a dissertation on health rights in international law
and philosophy in 2000.
Starting in the late 1990s, both Sen and Nussbaum
had begun to articulate the prospect that the CA could
provide the philosophical grounding to human rights.6
That is, through a process of global public deliberation,
certain basic human capabilities or freedoms can be iden-
tified as valuable and given the status of moral entitle-
ments or human rights. Encouraged by the plausibility of
human rights to capabilities, in my doctoral dissertation,
I set out to construct a moral/human right to the capa-
bility to be healthy. This would then be the basis of
2 I. Robeyns. The Capability Approach [Online]. Stanford: Stanford
University; 2011. Available: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/
entries/capability-approach/ [cited 2011April 19].
3 A. Sen. Rights and Agency. Philos Public Aff 1981; 2: 3–39.
4 A. Sen. Equality ofWhat?Choice, Welfare, andMeasurement. 1st MIT
Press ed. Cambridge MA:MIT Press; 1982; A. Sen. The Idea of Justice.
London: Allen Lane; 2009; M.C. Nussbaum. Creating capabilities : the
human development approach, CambridgeMA/ London: Belknap; 2011.
5 A. Sen. Rights and Capabilities. Resources, Values and Development.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1999; A. Sen. Rights as Goals.
Annual Conference for Legal and Social Philosophy. University College:
London; 1984; A. Sen. Rights and Agency. Philos Public Aff 1981; 2:
3–39.
6 A. Sen. Elements of a Theory of Human Rights. Philos Public Aff
2004; 32: 315–355; M.C. Nussbaum. Capabilities and Human Rights.
Fordham LawReview 1997; 66: 273–300.
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Health Justice. To give this argument coherence and sta-
bility across different relevant disciplines, I formulated
health as a capability, specifically a meta-capability of
capabilities. Second, I showed how this capability to be
healthy fits in with the latest insights in social epidemiol-
ogy, with supporting references to economic modelling
of capabilities such as in the case of famines. Third, I sit-
uated the argument for a CH within the capabilities
approach, and showed how a capability can be formu-
lated as a cluster right. Fourth, I defended it against the
dominant approaches namely the Rawlsian approach
developed by Norman Daniels, and utilitiarianism, such
as in cost-efficiency analysis using QALYs and DALYs.
And lastly, I discussed the problems of group capabilities
and global justice, and strategies for how the CH could
address them. As I state in the book, the argument pre-
sented is the first instalment. There are many aspects to
be developed, particularly regarding the implementation
or application of the concept. The fundamental aim of
the book was to set out the basic framework for a moral
right to the capability to be healthy, and its centrality to
social and global justice. The contributions of the current
special issue will be important influences on the next
instalment of the argument.
Four of six critics including Richardson, Schramme,
Tengland and Selgelid target their criticisms on the for-
mulation of health as meta-capability. I will first address
the conception of health critiques and then address the
other two contributions. In brief, Richardson argues that
I should pull back my conceptualization of health from
the ability to achieve or exercise ten central capabilities
to just the non-voluntary biological processes that are
the bases of the ten basic capabilities. Schramme argues
that condensing the ten basic capabilities into one meta-
capability to be healthy does not solve the CAs metric
or threshold problems. He also does not see the justifica-
tion of health conceptualized as the ability to achieve ten
basic capabilities. He advises that it would be better to
go with the disease conception of health as it is easily
justifiable, and provides clear methods to establish justice
claims and their limits. Tengland favours a conception of
health as simply having some basic first order abilities,
possibly akin to Richardsons suggestion. Selgelid,
among a long list of criticisms, argues that health as
capability is greatly at odds with usual conventions, and
that a claim to the capability to achieve the capability to
X or Y seems to be verging on the nonsensical, exhibit-
ing a form capabilities fetishism. Why not just a claim to
X and Y?
In the CA, the basic building blocks are the individual,
and her capabilities and functionings. A persons capabil-
ity to do or be something reflects the practical possibility
of her doing or being something. Such a capability or
practical possibility is made up of the combined interac-
tion of her individual endowments and skills and her
external environment. A persons capability is clearly not
just about her personal or internal traits or skills; a capa-
bility is an assessment of persons ability to be and do
something situated in her environment. Functionings is a
term to represent the actual outcomes or achievements
of the capabilities. For a variety of reasons, the quality of
life of an individual, (how well their life is going or their
wellbeing) is argued to be best conceptualized or eval-
uated in the space of her capabilities. This space of capa-
bilities is a more coherent space to evaluate wellbeing, it
is argued, than a persons actual beings and doings,
resource holdings such as income, or happiness, liberties,
basic needs, opportunities for welfare, and so forth. Fur-
thermore, CA theorists argue that the target of the moral
concern about inequality is also best directed towards
the space of capabilities.
Richardson and Tengland do not have any issue with
these aspects of the CA. Schramme and Selgelid do have
concerns. While Schramme appreciates the discussions
about the merits of the capability space over other tar-
gets of moral concern, he does not see how the CA
framework allows us to assess whether one individual
who is deprived in one capability is better or worse off
than another individual deprived in a different capability
space. Selgelid raises the point that capabilities largely
matter because they promote freedoms and enable
achievement of wellbeing. Well-being itself, however, is
ultimately important he says. As these points regard the
fundamentals of the CA, I defer to the large body of lit-
erature by Sen, Nussbaum and other colleagues.7 But
briefly, to respond to Schrammes point, Sen does not
offer an easy method for assessing or comparing the
capabilities of two individuals. If capabilities are to be
understood as freedoms, freedoms of different kinds are
also different social values. Thus, the question being
raised is about the commensurability of different values.
Furthermore, Sen has argued that the measurement of
capability needs to also be supplemented by contextual
analysis, and sensitive to process, non-domination, non-
discrimination, and so forth. As a result, Sen and other
CA theories readily accept that there will not always be
full social agreement on which individual is better off
than another, or how to rank different scenarios of well-
being. However, Sen suggests that great progress can be
made through efforts at achieving partial orderings;
and it is why public deliberation and impartial reasoning
have such significant roles in his approach. In
Nussbaums partial theory, two individuals not having
sufficient capabilities in different domains are incompa-
rable; they are both deprived in distinctly different ways.
A comparison of two capability domains in order to
make trade-offs is not allowed.
7 Sen 2009, op. cit. note 5; Nussbaum 2011, op. cit. note 4; Robeyns
2011, op. cit. note 2.
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In regard to Selgelid, I dont think he misunderstands
here the important value the CA places on self-
determination, or respecting the choice of individuals to
plan and pursue their life plans. In the cases of children,
and other dependent adults, the CA does aim for
achievements rather than just ensuring capabilities. But I
think Selgelid is making a different kind of point. He
writes that wellbeing can be seen as other things than
just positive mental states; it can include a range of plu-
ral goods such as autonomy, happiness, satisfaction and
other objective lists of goods. Thus, a list of objective
capabilities is too removed from all these kinds of possi-
ble plural goods of well-being. Furthermore, he disagrees
that the target of social policy as being wellbeing
achievements or functionings always violates the perso-
nal choice principle. While I acknowledge these points,
they are too general and require more elaboration to give
a good response. Otherwise, they seem to require the
rehearsing of the basic theory of the CA.
A core contribution of Health Justice is its conceptual-
ization of health as a capability. Sen and Nussbaum as
well as other CA theorists often referred to health in the
extant literature at that time as being an important or
central capability, but the underlying conception of
health was unclear. There were references to health as
being important for achieving basic capabilities, inequi-
ties in capabilities to achieve health, health capability
paradigm in healthcare, and so forth. I saw many ways
of conceptualizing health as a capability. Perhaps the
least philosophical was derived from the practical, public
health work of preventing HIV infections and the litera-
ture related to efforts to improve the sexual and repro-
ductive health of girls and women in developing
countries. The central idea from effective efforts and
health services research was that for an individual to pro-
tect themselves from a fatal or debilitating infection
requires the effective combination of individual knowl-
edge, skills, and agency as well as an environment with
supportive social and physical conditions. This line of
reasoning was commensurate with Sens analysis of the
acute and endemic starvation (famines). The ability of a
person to protect themselves from a fatal or debilitating
condition was akin to the ability of a person to be
adequately nourished. Borrowing from Sen even more, it
is not the availability of commodities in the locality, or
the persons happiness that is a good reflection of their
health but her abilities to protect, maintain, and promote
her beings and doings. Such an analysis also makes clear
how the availability of healthcare is an important com-
ponent, but cannot be the totality of the concern regard-
ing health; we need to focus on the abilities of each
individual in light of her internal endowments and skills
and external environment.
The recognition of the importance of capability versus
commodities or mental welfare, however, does not
address a related but conceptually separate issue. In the
case of famines, when we recognize that the capability to
be well nourished is a distinct and important space to
monitor in contrast to the space of actual nourishment
achievements (functionings), we are not also saying that
the capability to become well-nourished is, in fact, being
well nourished. The abilities to become well nourished
are distinct from actually being well nourished. So it
seems incorrect to say that because we should be con-
cerned about the abilities to be/become healthy, the abil-
ities or capabilities themselves constitute health, or being
healthy. The means to achieve health, or the determi-
nants, are being conflated with the constitutive compo-
nents of health. Schramme, Tengland, and Selgelid all
point to this error.
However, when we look towards popular or common
language notions of health, there is often a sense of
being healthy as being able to do things, and without
any pain or physical and mental constraint. In fact, it is
not just that being healthy is being able to do some-
thing, being healthy is also about the having the practi-
cal possibilities of doing a wide array of things. The
welfare or holistic theories of health start from this pop-
ular intuition, and develop a conception of health which
is centred on an individual being able to be and do
things in their environment. Lennart Nordenfelt argues
that health should be understood as the assessment of
the abilities to achieve vital goals. Or more specifically,
that health is an assessment of the second order abilities
to achieve vital goals in standard circumstances. The
second order ability is important here, as Nordefelt
argues, correctly in my view, because being unable to
achieve ones vital goals has to mean that one is unable
to achieve a vital goal in standard circumstances as well
as one is unable to learn or recover the ability to achieve
ones vitals goals. Learning or recovering the ability to
achieve vital goals put you on your way to being
healthy. Conversely, to be healthy is more precisely hav-
ing the second-order ability to achieve vital goals; to be
able to develop the ability. Despite it sounding odd, the
capability to be capable of doing something is not so
foreign to the CA. However, Tengland rejects the need
for this second-order ability, and prefers a conception of
health that is simply having some basic physical and
mental abilities. Simply put, a person who is undernour-
ished is unhealthy. It is hugely counterintuitive, accord-
ing to Tengland, to say that they are unhealthy only
when they also lack the ability to learn or recover their
ability to be nourished. I would argue that Tengland is
taking the conceptual corollary necessary to clearly
assert that someone is not able to achieve a vital goal
and thus, not healthy, and over-exaggerating it as a con-
ceptual weakness of the idea of health as being capable
to achieve a cluster of basic capabilities. I defer here to
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Nordenfelt, who does a sufficient job explaining second-
order ability.8
The language of capabilities and functionings was ini-
tially used by Sen and Nussbaum to put across some
basic concepts. They were concepts that Nussbaum bor-
rowed from Aristotle. However, most CA theorists and
advocates, I would argue, recognize that one cannot
describe flesh and blood human beings only in terms of
a simple set of capabilities and functionings. Even Nuss-
baum, who argues that a person with a life with mini-
mum human dignity has at least certain ten basic
capabilities, recognizes that the ten capabilities are con-
ceptually distinct but are inter-dependent. And that as
people go through life, their capabilities lead to function-
ings, which can then lead to more capabilities, and so
forth. Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalitt identified
what they call corrosive disadvantage and fertile
functionings.9 That is, the lack of certain capabilities can
be grossly damaging to other capabilities and function-
ings, while some functionings can be hugely beneficial to
engendering other capabilities and functionings. Capabil-
ities can be affected by or dependent on other capabilities
and functionings. So rather than being non-sensical and
fetishistic, as Selgelid claims, there is plausibility in the
understanding that being capable to achieve X can be a
constitutive component of being capable of achieving Y.
Or, having the capability to X means having the capabil-
ity to develop the capability Y.
One way I modify Nordenfelts concept of health as
the ability to achieve vital goals is that I fill in the vital
goals with Nussbaums ten central human capabilities.
As she states, her list is not exhaustive, but the ten capa-
bility domains are a fixed minimum. Because I want to
define health as the ability to achieve ten vital goals/basic
capabilities, I specify Nussbaums second capability
which refers to bodily health as relating to disease and
impairment. This means that being able to prevent, miti-
gate or recover from disease and impairment is an
important component of health but only one of a cluster
of components. Richardson, Schramme, and Selgelid
press that point that I have too easily abandoned the
concept of disease, especially the Boorsean notion. But I
have not. Boorses conception of disease can plausibly
still live in the second capability. At this point, health is
conceptualized as a cluster of ten basic human capabil-
ities that are constantly developing, interdependent, and
iterative. And applying the second-order ability compo-
nent of Nordenfelts definition gives us the ability to
achieve a cluster of basic capabilities; a meta-capability.
Some critics point out that while I may have used
Nordenfelts framework for a definition of health, I
have somehow missed doing two things. Selgelid states
that I have said very little about the relationship between
each of the basic capabilities and health. And second, I
have not justified a conception of health as being a clus-
ter of basic capabilities. I have to accept these two
points. In the search for a usable conception of health in
capability theory, Nordenfelts framework seemed ready
made and insightful. Once I amended his theory of
health from the ability to achieve vital goals to achieve
basic capabilities, I assumed the job was done. I sug-
gested that if there were objections to this particular list
of basic capabilities, there are possibilities of producing
a different set, perhaps using different methods from
those Nussbaum used. So, given that I defined health as
being constituted of ten basic capabilities, I did not see
how describing each capabilitys link to health was going
to be more helpful. Regarding justification, the defining
of health in terms of Nussbaums ten central human
capabilities would provide both the ethical reasoning for
the value of each capability as well as the justification
she offers for the moral claims of the central human
capabilities. Furthermore, given how notoriously difficult
previous attempts have been to separate health from
wellbeing, the minimal conception of wellbeing devel-
oped by Nussbaum could also help to contain health
from expanding into total wellbeing. From the start, I
also rely on Sens conceptions of capabilities as basic
freedoms and his methods of justification. The basic
capabilities that constitute health were grounded in both
dignity and freedoms. So Schrammes assertion that I
have hidden or elided the need to justify the value of
health conceived as ten basic capabilities is unfair. I am
open to criticisms about health as the ability to achieve
basic capabilities, but for justification of the value of the
basic capabilities or freedoms, I rely on Sen and
Nussbaum.
Richardson presents the critique that health cannot
be the metacapability of having central human capabil-
ities, nor can it be a metacapability of having the cen-
tral human capabilities. If I understand correctly, his
worry starts with the recognition of health as being
distinct from other capabilities and important goods
such as income, and the the criss-crossing web of
causal dependencies among health, education, income,
and wealth and each of the ten central human capa-
bilities. Another concern follows from the understand-
ing that having a capability to X is meant to imply the
practical possibility of achieving X. Then, according to
my definition of health, a capability to be healthy
implies that individuals have the practical possibility
to achieve all ten central human capabilities. Given
that many societies in the world do not or cannot pro-
vide the social environments to ensure the practical
8 L. Nordenfelt, G. Khushf, K.W.M. Fulford.Health, Science, and Ordi-
nary Language, Amsterdam: Rodopi; 2001.
9 J. Wolff, A. De-Shalit.Disadvantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press;
2007.
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possibility of achieving ten central capabilities, then in
many countries no one is healthy. It seems counter-
intuitive to Richardson to accept that the extent of
how health a person is varies directly with features of
their countrys constitutional regime, robustness of job
market, and reach of educational system. The social
determinants of health become just too expansive. The
solution that Richardson proposes is to define health
relating to the non-voluntary, bodily substrate or bod-
ily processes related to basic capabilities including res-
piration, immune response, blood clotting and so
forth. While they are non-voluntary, they would fall
under Sens understanding of effective freedom. That
is, the individual would have chosen such a capability
or functioning had she been able to choose. So,
Richardson suggests the amendment which would
result in the definition that health is the non-
voluntary, bodily aspect of the metacapability for the
central human capabilities.
While Richardsons insightful and generous evaluation
is illuminating, I will hold off from readily accepting the
amendment. I am not troubled by the idea of the health
capability of individuals is determined by national and
even global factors. For example, the lack of a function-
ing education system precludes individuals from becom-
ing literate, and this reduces their wellbeing. If health
was understood as a minimal conception of wellbeing,
and it includes a literacy capability, then than the lack
of a functioning educational system reduces or con-
strains that persons health. The analysis of the broad
social factors on the beings and doings of individuals,
their health and wellbeing, is the bread and butter work
of social epidemiologists and macroeconomics. The
related point is that it seems too counter-intuitive to
accept that based on the health capability idea, that the
majority of people in a country are not healthy. This
worry may be tempered by a closer look at Nussbaums
list of basic capabilities and her sufficiency thresholds.
They are really not as demanding as some people imag-
ine. She argues for social conditions that provide basic
literacy and numeracy, not formal education up to a cer-
tain standard. At the same time, the real power of this
argument for a health metacapability is to reveal the
true extent of the many human beings who are below a
minimal level of wellbeing. Just as our understanding of
human deprivation was transformed when we moved
from measuring premature mortality to include disabil-
ity, we will see yet more when move to measuring health
capability. The multidimensional poverty index is a
move in such a direction.10
VULNERABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY
Christine Straehles contribution is both surprisingly
original and welcome. I learned a great deal about a sub-
ject that I knew little about, namely liberal individual
vulnerability. Her assertion is that health should not be
considered as a meta-capability or pressed as a strong or
central claim of social justice. Using various examples of
vulnerability, she argues that there are certain back-
ground conditions of vulnerability that affect the health-
enabling decisions of individuals, where health capability
social interventions cannot reach, therefore, revealing the
concepts limits. The argument is even stronger as she
argues that these background conditions of vulnerability
may provide a case against the strong claim that health
capability is central to social justice; in such conditions it
may be more important to support other capabilities, not
health capability. While I am intrigued with the final
example, and acknowledge the force of her conclusion, I
am confused by the final section. The penultimate para-
graph juxtaposes my argument for health as meta-
capability next to Nussbaums list of capabilities.
Straehle then states that the case may require that it
would be better to promote Nussbaums capability to
control ones environment rather the health metacapabil-
ity. This raises a worry that Straehle has missed the
important part of my argument where health metacap-
ability is defined as the capability to achieve Nussbaums
ten central capabilities. This confusion seems to under-
mine her move to build the case against health capability
being central to social justice. However, it would be still
be interesting to consider how a health metacapability,
properly understood as a capability to achieve a cluster
of ten basic capabilities, would deal with the final sce-
nario. I also have concerns that my health capability
argument may have been conflated with other capabilities
the work of scholars who talk more about health agency.
Lastly, Sen has argued that aside from the capability
space, it is also important to examine the context, pro-
cess concerns, ensuring non-domination, non-discrimina-
tion and so forth. It seems to me that in addition to
these dimensions, vulnerability is also something to be
examined.
GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE
The contribution of Kollar and colleagues focuses on the
global health duty that arises from the argument for
every human beings right to the capability to be healthy,
wherever we find them. They write that in its current
form, the argument gives rise to humanitarian duties
rather than demands of justice. They then generously
explain how a more explicit focus on the social
10 S. Alkire, M.E. Santos. Acute Multidimensional Poverty: A New
Index for Developing Countries.OPHIWorking Papers. Oxford: Oxford
Poverty &HumanDevelopment Initiative; 2010.
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determinants of health would make a stronger candidate
for producing duties of justice. The present weaknesses,
according to Kollar and colleagues are that Nussbaums
list of central capabilities has many substantial criticisms
against it, and that its grounding in the concept of equal
human dignity gives rise to humanitarian duties not
demands of global health justice. Furthermore, the CA
more broadly lacks some crucial elements of a theory of
justice such as an account of injustice and obligation.
The weakness specific to my particular argument for
health capability, they claim, is that I do not attach any
normative significance to the causes of the deprivations
and failures of health capability. We do not know
whether a capability deprivation was caused by some
agent or if it merely happened. The former would raise a
justice duty while the latter would be a humanitarian
duty.
Let me first address the issue about relying on
Nussbaums arguments for basic human capabilities. I
am assuming that they have concluded that the list of
basic capabilities grounded in equal human dignity is
not sufficiently justifiable. And even if it was, that it
gives rise to humanitarian duties to protect the health
capability of foreigners, rather than demands of justice.
Selgelid is much less charitable about relying on the
concept of dignity. He writes that it is unfortunate that
I tie my concept of health to dignity as many bioethi-
cists now consider it to be meaningless. Furthermore,
he points out that Nussbaums reasoning about dignity
has been examined closely and was found to reflect the
kind of confusion bioethicists worry about. This scru-
tiny and criticism of Nussbaums list or grounding in
dignity is not unexpected. The health capability argu-
ment relies on both Nussbaums dignity and Sens
freedoms. As my focus was largely on developing the
concept of health as capability, I did not try to find
alternative ethical grounding for capabilities. While I
appreciate the worry about dignity, I am not willing to
give it up just yet, even if all bioethicists have aban-
doned it. At the same time, Sens grounding of capabil-
ities in the fundamental value of freedom, and his
method of justification, make it even more difficult to
derive global health duties. So, I do accept the criti-
cism that the fundamental justifications for basic capa-
bilities need to be examined more closely.
Finally, while focused on the lack of normative attribu-
tion of the causes, and duties of justice, I think Kollar
and her colleagues have missed out on a lot more. I have
argued that the moral concern for health is multi-
dimensional – there are moral dimensions to the causes,
consequences, levels, distributions patterns, experience,
and so forth. And I did, indeed, discuss who has what
kind of duties in relation to the multiple-dimensions of
the capability to be healthy (156-57). In the global con-
text, I suggested that Thomas Pogges arguments for neg-
ative, positive, and intermediate duties have a long reach.
However, I am not sure how much the relational view
will cover all these various dimensions. They are indeed
correct that I did not spend enough time discussing the
normative role of the social determinants of health both
domestically and globally. Their contribution is very illu-
minating, and helpful in motivating me to focus more
energy on the global health justice and duties aspect of
social determinants of health. I believe that it will also
motivate a number of other individuals, including some
colleagues who are philosophers of causation and
explanation.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust (WT094245); and the
ESRC-DFID Joint Programme on Poverty Alleviation (RES-167-25-
0369).
Sridhar Venkatapuram is a Lecturer in Global Health and Philos-
ophy at Kings College London, and a Senior Research Associate
in Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg. His areas of
research and expertise are social and global justice philosophy,
capabilities approach, human rights, and global health epidemiol-
ogy and ethics. He has training in various disciplines including
International Relations (Brown), History (SOAS), Public Health
(Harvard), Sociology, and Political Philosophy (Cambridge).
Commentary 55
VC 2015 The Authors Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
